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IN THE SUPREME COUBT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING CENTER, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and FRANK S. WARNER and OLOF E. 
ZUNDEL, Commissioners, and UTAH 
POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14568 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Hereafter the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. will be 
called, "plaintiff" or "mall", the Public Service Commission of Utah will 
be called "Commission" and the Utah Power and Light Company will be called 
"Utah Power". 
This action Involves an action before the Commission wherein 
the plaintiff applied for a certificate of convenience and necessity to 
operate as a public utility to provide electrical power to its tenants only or, 
in the alternative, that the commission find the applicant is not a public 
utility thereby allowing it to provide electrical power to its tenants 
without regulation from the commission. This proceeding deals only with 
the second aspect of the case. The commission set the matter of determining 
the status of the plaintiff's special petition (R.10). The hearing was 
held February 24, I976. The only matters presented at the hearing were in 
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regards to whether or not the plaintiff would be a public utility and this is 
the only matter before the Honorable Court. The matter of plaintifffs 
application for a certificate of convenience and necessity was deferred 
pending the outcome of this appeal. Utah Power moved to dismiss the 
application, 
DISPOSITION BY THE COMMISSION 
Arguments were presented by the applicant's attorney, 
Keith E. Sohm, by counsel for Utah Power and light Co., Robert Gordon, and 
by G. Blaine Davis, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of the Division of 
Public Utilities. The argument by the Public Utilities Division questioned 
that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision accurately protrayed Utah 
law and seems to support the plaintiffs position. (R>3-5)« After hearing 
arguments and without reading the memorandum provided by the applicant 
(R« 19-121) the Commission ruled from the bench that the applicant's operations 
would be that of a public utility and that a certificate would be required. 
The commission's written order, dated March iO, 1976 (R. 123), granted Utah 
Power's motion to dismiss "insofar as said motion relates to the alternative 
prayer of said application that the commission determine that the proposed 
electric service to be supplied by applicant is not subject to regulation by 
the commission..,". The commission further stated! 
"2. That said Motion to Dismiss is granted, with respect 
to the issue of whether or not the applicants proposed service 
would be subject to regulation by this Commission, on the 
grounds and for the reason that such issue has been specifically 
determined by a court of lawr in litigation involving the same 
parties hereto, wherein it was found that the proposed electric 
service was not exempt from application of the public utility 
laws of this State and the same could not be supplied unless the 
supplier first obtained a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity and the doctrine of Res Judicata is, therefore, 
applicable and determinative of such question (Cottonwood Mall 
Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light Company, Civil No. 229-68, 
Federal District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed 
Circuit Court of Appeals 9th Circuit, 440 F. 2d 36, Certiorari 
denied U. S. Supreme Court 30 L. Ed. 2nd 99)." 
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Thereafter a timely motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration 
was filed by the plaintiff and duly denied by the Commission in its order 
dated April 15, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the Commissions order reversed and 
seeks a finding and an order holding that the Cottonwood Mall Shopping 
Center, Inc. can operate its own power plant providing electrical power to 
itself and its own tenants and that such operations are not that of a public 
utility and do not require regulation by the Public Service Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The plaintiff owns and maintains the entire Cottonwood Mall 
facility including buildings, land, roadways, sidewalks and parking areas 
without exception. There are approximately 70 tenants occupying the buildings, 
stores, and offices including merchants and professional people. The leases 
provide that the lessees lease a particular area of the shopping center 
"together with the use with other lessees of said shopping center." The 
leases provide that the merchant shall share in the expense of lighting the 
parking lot and exterior of the building, for the painting of automobile 
parking stalls and sweeping and cleaning the parking area including the 
removal of snow and ice and the maintenance of green areas of the shopping 
center including shrubs, trees, lawn, flowers and other plantings. The mall 
and parking area are owned and maintained by plaintiff for the benefit of its 
tenants. 
An association of the merchants of the Cottonwood Mall has been 
organized as a nonprofit corporation for the purpose of satisfying and aiding 
the promotion of business at the mall, and to assist in making a determination 
of the activities which should be conducted in the shopping center and 
parking area. The board of directors of this association consists of persons 
elected by the merchants and of Mr. Sidney M. Horman, president of the 
plaintiff corporation* All of the activities held at the mall must have 
the approval of the board of directors of the association and of Mr. Horman. 
All of the activities permitted have for their ultimate function the 
promotion of traffic and business at the Cottonwood Mall for the merchants 
who conduct their business there. 
THE COTTONWOOD MALL PIANT 
The Cottonwood Mall Power plant was commenced by Horman 
Construction Company only after its President and Manager, S. M# Horman, 
discussed the matter thoroughly with the Commissioners of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah and was reassured that the plant would not be 
a public utility and that no certificate would be required as long as 
service was provided to its tenants only. In arranging tentative agreements 
with Mountain Fuel Supply, a public utility, that company also concluded 
that the operation would not be that of a public utility. 
Pursuant to these assurances, the applicant built and completed 
the construction of its electrical power plant consisting among other things 
of five nearly new large 1000 K¥ generators as more fully described in 
Exhibit 2 (Engineering report R. 32-^9 and pictures of the plant R. 50-53). 
The plant was completed in 1S*68 at a cost of about $1,500,000 and is located 
in a building just south of the shopping center. The entire plant and 
transmission system is located entirely on and through the private property 
of the Mall and all transmission lines and control facilities are installed 
and ready for operation. The plaintiff owns the entire mall facility 
including buildings and land, roadways, sidewalks and parking areas without 
exception. 
THE MALL PLANT IS ADEQUATE AND ENERGY-CONSERVING 
The whole system has been carefully engineered 'to cover all the 
needs of the tenants. The maximum electrical needs of the mall and its 
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tenants is about 3200 KM. Three of the five units, running with a slight 
overload, or three and a half units on light loajd could fully supply the 
peak electrical demands of the whole Hall, There would always be at least 
one power plant always available for emergency service. These are the 
very finest heavy duty high quality power plants that money can buy -
worth many times more now than the price paid for them years ago, The 
chance of a breakdown or failure of even one unit is very remote and the 
chances of an electrical outage is far less since the plant and transmission 
lines are all together. Most outage problems come from exposed substations 
and transformers and long distance transmission lines such as operated by 
Utah Power and light Company, A good example is the eastern blockout a 
few years ago and the recent July k9 19?6 Utah Power and Light Company 
outage. 
The carefully designed "total-energy" system of the Cottonwood 
Mall would be 70 to 75 percent efficient if not better because it uses 
nearly, all of the energy developed by burning natural gas. Heat recovery 
equipment has been installed to capture waste heat ftom the engines. Heat, 
which is a natural by-product from burning gas to produce electricity, would 
be fully utilised in the Mall plant for hot water, space heating and air 
conditioning or, we could say electricity would be a welcome energy conserving 
by-product from the present burning of gas for hot water, heat and air con-
ditioning as presently being done wasting, of course, all of the energy that 
would normally be used tip in producing electricity. In other words, the 
Cottonwood Mall electrical plant would be 75% efficient in use of energy 
because it would provide all the buildings and the tenants with all of their 
electrical, hot water, space heating, and alrcondltloning needs. 
On the other hand, the generating plants of Utah Power and light 
are only about 30^ efficient since only a small part of the energy is captured, 
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that which goes into electricity, the rest is dissipated into the air or 
into the nearby streams and lakes. In the Utah Power system another five 
percent is lost in the transmission system reducing its overall efficiency to 
some 25-30^. In the Mall system most of what would be wasted in the Utah 
power system is recaptured and utilised. In these days when energy conser-
vation is so vitally necessary, waste should not be permitted when there is 
a better alternative. The protestants have shown their concern about power 
shortage as reflected in news notes Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 (R. 104-106) and 
Case No, 7167 and others. The Federal government is also gravely concerned, 
A minimal trained staff has been retained to care for the 
equipment and regularly test it. The gas furnaces and boilers are now in 
regular use to produce heat, hot water and air conditioning. Presently the 
energy that would go into turning the generator is being wasted - the 
generator could be in full operation with very little extra gas fuel usage. 
The generators have been fired up and operated briefly every week or so 
since their installation to keep them in operating condition, The whole 
system could be placed in operation within a few days. 
Plaintiff intends to furnish electrical power only to itself 
and its tenants in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center and it does not intend 
to furnish electrical power to any other person than a tenant. 
Plaintiff intends to include the charges for electrical power, 
heating and air conditioning in the monthly rental rates of the tenants. The 
buildings, stores, malls, parking lot, plant and the land on which they 
stand and the land on which the electrical wires, ducts and equipment are 
placed are private property owned by plaintiff and have not been dedicated to 
a public use, 
COMPARABLE SYSTEMS 
There are now literally hundreds of Mtotal-energy" systems in 
operation in the United States (R, 77 gives I966 summary and R, 78-103 gives 
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1972 directory of total energy plants and R, 101 shows eight such plants in 
operation in Utah.) Total energy is a fact of life that Utah Power and 
Light Company and all power companies have come to accept. Some other 
power companies like Utah Power and Light Company will not give up easily 
but nevertheless recognize that "total-energy" developments cannot be stopped 
and, as a matter of fact, are advantageous and becoming more and more 
necessary because of the heavy demands for electrical power which the 
protestant acknowledged repeatedly in recent hearings before this Commission. 
Utah has its share of total energy systems including the Canyon 
Crest Apartments in the mouth of Emigration Canyon which is a 17-floor 125 
unit high rise dwelling that is completely independent of outside power sources 
(R. 55t56). In almost ten years of experience there have been very few 
outages and then generally only for seconds. The savings on utility costs 
have been phenominal while power costs continue to rise to the extent of two 
or three increases a year. 
The Mountain Fuel Supply Company office building on 1st South and 
2nd East is another total energy building. If the law turns on the building 
being used by the public as well as the owner or tenants, both of these 
Utah "total-energy" buildings are comparable to the Cottonwood Mall. The gas 
company building has the public coming in and out all of the time to pay 
bills and conduct business. The public use the heated sidewalks, the 
lighted parking areas and are allowed to use the company1s auditorium for 
seminars, various meetings and many other purposes. 
The Harrisburg East Shopping Mall in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania is a 
"total-energy" system (R. 57-59)• There are total energy shopping centers in 
Massachusetts, New York, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Pennsylvania 
as of 1968. (R. 61). There axe probably many more now. The Pennsylvania 
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Public Service Commission, like many other Commissions, have ruled these 
total energy projects are not utilities, The Pennsylvania Commission in 
answer to my questions stated as followsi 
"5. It is the opinion of this Commission that utility 
services furnished to tenants of private property and not to 
the public in general are exempt from the provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Law," 
"6, This Commission has for some time recognized an 
energy crises and encouraged utility companies and their 
customers to participate in conservation programs that will 
extend our natural gas and petroleum resourses. We have 
ordered the electric and gas utilities to discontinue 
promotional advertising. Gas utilities are generally not 
permitted to add new customers but are permitted to accept 
replacement customers. (R.UO) 
The Florida Commission stated as followss 
"5. The shopping centers do not meet the qualifications 
of a public utility under Florida statute 355 since they 
do not offer service to the public generally but serve only 
their own tenants. They are, thereforef exempt from regulations 
by the Public Service Commission. (R. 113) 
Other Commissions gave similar answers. (R. 107-121) 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH ERRORED IN HOLDING THAT 
A RULING OF THE FEDERAL COURT IS RES JUDICATA BINDING THE STATE OF UTAH 
ESPECIALLY SINCE SOME OF THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE RULING WAS BASED HAVE 
CHANGED. 
In the case of Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. vs. Utah 
Power and Light Company, C 229-68 affirmed W*0 F. 2d 36, the Honorable 
Judge Willis W. Ritterf without hearing any evidence granted the defendants 
motion to dismiss and treated the matter as a motion for Summary Judgement 
and found in favor of the defendants, Utah Power and Light. 
In making this ruling the Court noted that Eldredge Furniture 
Company had purchased its store area so that it was not a tenant. The Court 
also noted some activities were allowed on the premises. 
The Court should note that conditions have changed since that 
ruling was handed down. Edlredge Furniture Company sold its store unit back 
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to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff owns all of the mall area. 
We respectfully submit that the Federal Court errored anyhow 
since diverse activities could not convert private property into public 
property. 
Federal Courts are bound to follow the laws and rulings of 
the state in which the Court sits, Both the lower and upper Federal Court, 
in absence of a case interpreting the Utah law Section 54-2-1 (20) defining 
an electrical corporation, undertook to determine what the Utah Legislature 
intended and what Utah Courts would have held. The Court of Appeals put 
it this wayi 
"We begin our analysis by recognizing that there are 
few if any Utah lampposts to light our Erie way. But as this 
is a case in which there is no specific "state law" we need 
not be dismayed since the Federal Court may look to all 
resources including "the decisions of other states, federal 
decisions or the general weight of author!ty" the goal being 
"that the Federal Court reach the result that would probably 
be reached were the question to be litigated in a state Court" 
"1 Barren and Holtzoff Federal Practice and Procedure Section 
8 page 40, Cottonwood Mall vs, Utah Power and Light, 1971 
440 F, 2d 36 (40). 
The Court cited its own decision in Mutual of Omaha vs, 
Russell, 402 F, 2d 339 (343)r "This is deciding what /Utah/ would decide 
on a question they have never decided". Then the Court goes on to conjecture 
as to what the Utah Courts would have done. Clearly the Public Service 
Commission could have and should have interpreted Utah law and do exactly 
what the Federal Court found lacldng that is to create a Utah decision. In 
this day when the federal government has usurped so much of the states 
perrogatives neither the Utah Commission nor the Utah Court should concede 
so graciously to a federal courts interpretation as to what we would do. 
Because it was ill informed on the nature of Utahns and Utah Courts, the 
Federal Court made very vital wrong presumption when it found that "we 
must give a liberal reading to provisions subjecting the activity to 
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regulation while simultaneously giving a more narrow scope to the 
exceptions." 
Obviously the court doesn't know that Utah was founded by 
people looking for tree agency and freedom from controls. Our state and 
our schools fight constantly against controls and restraints of government, 
our state, of all states, clings as much as possible to the free 
enterprise system and bows only reluctantly to regulation of any kind. No 
one could claim Utah holds to strict construction in favor of regulation, 
The Utah State Constitution in Article 1 Section 1 affirms the 
inherent right to freedom and opportunity saying: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property , , , " 
One Supreme Court case in Utah has held the rights guaranteed by this 
section are invaded when one is not at liberty with others with respect 
to the use to which he may subject his property or use or employ his time 
or talents (Golding vs, Schubach Optical Company, 93 Utah 32). The 
intent of the framers of the Constitution of the state of Utah, the unique 
history of the intent of the framers and the adoption of the provisions 
of protection of property in the Utah Constituion show what strong 
feelings they had about free enterprise. The constitution of the state 
of Utah was adopted in convention in 1895 "by 107 state delegates, 7^ percent of w 
were members of the Mormon faith and 32 delegates of which were "high 
officials of the Mormon Church." Unique in the history of the adoption of 
state constitutions is the fact that the 1895 convention was the sixth 
convention over a period of nearly a one-half century experience in drawing up 
various Utah Constitutions, Utah citizins had met in constitutional 
conventions in 18^9, I856, 1862, 1872 and 1887 before their sixth effort in 
1895 which was accepted by the United States Congress and afterwhich statehood 
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was granted (Wayne Stout, History of Utah, Volume 1, 18?0-1896f 1967 
pages ^ 90-^95). The Mormon faith, then and now, had strong and clearly 
declared views with respect to the Constitution of the United States and 
those feelings clearly reflect the intentions of the framers of the Utah 
Constitution to allow a large degree of free enterprise, 
Even our Public Service Commission has ruled against its own 
jurisdiction over certain air carriers, over motel shuttle buses, over 
certain motor vehicle services as being incidental to river trips, over 
Judds Recreational Bus as being incidental to therapy, over feed and 
fertilizer carriers, and restricting its own jurisdiction over wrecker 
vehicles. 
Our land and Utah particularly are founded and thrive on the 
theory of free enterprise, Regulation is at the best a poor substitute 
though sometimes admittedly necessary, 
In the matter of the application of N, L, Industries, Inc. 
Case IIof 695^ issued November 79 197^ the Commission held the applicant was 
not a public utility. The Commission reaffirmed its definition of a public 
utility as it.has done so many times before in stating! 
",.,the parties in question were not public utilities 
because they did not hold themselves out to offer services to 
the public generally," 
To further show the liberal view of our Commission toward 
regulation it further stated 1 
"As can be observed from the foregoing findings we have not 
specifically found that existing transportation facilities do 
not provide adequate or reasonable service. Nor, do we believe 
it is necessary to so find in this case where applicant's 
proposed service would substantially reduce the burden on the 
highway, promote conservation of fuel, eliminate unnecessary 
wasteful practices, decrease air pollution, and provide trans-
portation services for applicant's employees at a cost to the 
employee which should encourage their use of such service. See 
Salt Lake-Kanab Freight Lines v, A,B, Robinson, 339 P 2nd 99 -(Utah, 
I959) and Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc, v. Public Service Commission, 
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233 P 2nd 344 (Utah, 1951 ). M 
The cases of State Ex. Reia Public Utilities Commission v. 
Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237, 239 (1925)? Medic-call Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2nd 273f 470 P 2nd 258 (19?0)| and Garkane 
Power Company v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. 2nd 571 (1940). 
McCarthy v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 111 Utah 489 all deal with the 
definition of "Public Utility". The court in each of those cases held that 
the parties in question were not public utilities because they did not hold 
themselves out to offer their services to the public generally. 
I think the Commission clearly errored in not making Utah Law 
in this case but even though the Commission may be reluctant, certainly 
the Utahfs highest Court has the perogative and duty of deciding what 
Utah's holding would be in such a case as this and is not bound by the 
principle of Res Judicata. As the good Federal Court Judge has pointed 
out the Federal must follow Utah law, not visa versa. 
Contrary to the opinion of the Federal Court there are 
obviously numerous cases in Utah both as a result of Commission ruling and 
as a result of this Courts decisions which court have enlightened the Courts 
"Erie" path and improved its "Erie" decision. 
The Courts have held that Commissions have no inherit powers 
only as expressly granted by the legislature. There must be a strict con-
struction of the constitution and statutes to find jurisdiction, Lake Shore v. 
Veiling 9 Ut. 2 114 339 P. 2nd 101 also Commercial Life Ins. v. Wright 64 Ariz. 
129, 166 P. 2nd 943. 
Where statutes confer specific powers on a commission with 
limited powers such as the Public Service Commission of Utah, its powers are 
limited to those specifically mentioned in the statute. Union Pacific vs. 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 103 Ut. 186, 134 P. 2 469. 
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The Public Service Commission has a duty to supervise use of natural 
resources by a utility so that they will be neither wasted nor misused to 
assure adequate and continued service to the public. McMullan vs. Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 7 Ut. 2 157, 320 P. 2 1107. 
POINT II 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH ERRORED IN NOT DECIDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S PLAN OF OPERATION WAS WITHIN THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
DEFINITION OF "ELECTRICAL CORPORATION", AND IN HOLDING, THEREFORE, THAT 
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR PLAINTIFF TO OBTAIN A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE 
AND NECESSITY BEFORE IT COULD GENERATE AND DISTRIBUTE ELECTRICAL SERVICES 
TO THE COTTONWOOD MALL. 
Though we are not here before the Court as a result of finding 
by the Commission the effect of the Commissions failure to make a finding 
is the same. As stated in the case, McCarthy vs. Public Service Commission 
of Utah 111 Utah 489 (491)* 
••The only question we have is: Did the commission by 
its order convert "private contracts or a mere private business 
into a public utility or make its owner a common carrier?" 
State v. Nelson, cited above 6$ Utah at page 462, 238 P. at 
page 239i hZ A. L. R. 849, Or in issuing these orders did the 
commission act "arbitrarily or capriciously?" Gilmer v. Public 
Utilities Comm., 67 Utah 222, at page 238, 247 P. 284, at page 
290. As far as classifying defendants correctly is concerned 
it makes no difference whether defendants object to the 
classification or some one else objects so long as the party 
objecting has standing before this court to object." 
Obviously both theCommission and the Court have the right to 
classify public utilities but cannot convert a private business into a 
public utility. Neither can the legislature convert a private business into 
a public utility. 
The Massachusetts commission under a similar matter ruled as 
follows t 
"A shopping center landlord is not a gas or electric company 
subject to regulation under a statute subjecting to regulation "all 
. . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and sale or 
distribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" where the 
landlord, using gas either directly or converting it, proposed to 
provide total energy service ~ heating, electric current, domestic 
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hot water, and chilled water for air conditioning — for 
which each tenant initially will pay 55 cents per annum per 
square foot as an additional component of the rental, and 
where the landlord will make meter readings of such service to 
tenants for two years, on which to establish charges for the 
remainder of 10-year leases without regard to the quantity of 
energy consumed by the tenants during such period; the commission 
found that the arrangement was Mrent inclusion." Re Frank 
Properties, Inc. (1963) 72 FUR 3d 305." 
The key provision of the Utah Code to be interpreted here is 
Section 5^-2-1 (20) which provides a definition of anMelectrical corporation" 
This section excludes from the term "electrical corporation" and hence 
from regulation by this Commission, operations which meet the following test: 
"where electricity is generated on or distributed by the producer through 
private property alone, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely 
for his own use, or the use of his tenants . . ,". 
The three elements necessary to qualify under the exception in the 
above cited statute are as follows: 
(1) That the electricity be generated and distributed through 
private property alone, i.e., property not dedicated to public use. 
(2) The generation and distribution by the producer must be 
solely for his own use or the use of his tenants. 
(3) That the electricity must not be for sale to others. 
There can be no dispute that the Mall property is private property 
upon which this electricity is generated and' distributed and that it has not 
been dedicated to public use. 
As to (l) above — Property does not become public property merely 
because the public uses the property but it requires a formal dedication such 
as a subdivision formally turning over its roads to the county. The county 
then owns the property, repairs and cares for it with public taxes. 
As to (3) above -- There is no contention or dispute that the 
electricity will not be for sale to anyone except tenants, in fact it will not 
be sold to tenants but given to the tenants as part of their rental contracts. 
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As to (2) above -- The generation and distribution of electricity 
by the Kail is solely for the Mallfs own use or the use of its tenants. The 
Judge Ritter ruling turned on this subsection. The court considered two 
factors to defeat the exception. The first factor was that Eldredge 
Furniture Company was privately owned and not a tenant. This condition is 
no longer in existence since Eldredge sold its holdings back to the Mall. 
All companies and stores in the Mall are now tenants and no electricity will 
go to anyone or any firm except the Mall or its tenants. The second factor 
was really stretching out when the court in effect found that people coming 
in and out of the Mall and not buying anything were benefitting from or 
having the use of this electrical distribution. Of course, the electricity 
will be used for lighting the stores, the parking lot and the common 
facilities. Who could possibly argue this is not exclusively for the mall or 
the use of its tenants. The fact a ray of light shines on a customer when the 
customer parks his car, or another ray of light hits the customer as he comes in 
the main entrance or the fact that he may be bathed in light as he looks 
at merchandise in a store doesn't mean the customer has been benefitted or 
provided with service. Any sound mind must reason that the benefit and service 
is provided to the tenant merely to attract the customers and induce them to 
make purchases from or procure services of the Mall tenants. Likewise, the 
practice of the Mall in allowing displays to. be set up, civic and church 
groups to use the Mall facilities is likewise service to the tenants as part of 
a well organized advertising and promotional program for the benefit of the 
tenants. Without the tenants there would be absolutely no reason for the 
existence of this plant. The electricity could only be used for plaintiff1s 
own purposes and for the purposes of the tenants. The customers who come to 
the Mall and the persons who come to dance and to the various shows and 
attractions that are put on at theMall are people who take advantage of these 
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facilities only because they were of use to the tmuxnts in furtherance 
of their business. To interpret the statute and tin application any more 
strictly would mean the statute was converting a itrivate business into a 
public utility which in turn means either the statute is unconstitutional or 
the Court errored in construing it. 
The fact that electricity is provided to a home for heating, cookii 
and inside and outside lighting and someone driver, in the lighted driveway, 
walks to a lighted entry and enters a lighted hount* does not mean the visitor 
is being provided with electrical service. Likewise, a visitor to the "total-
energy " Canyon Crest Apartments or the Mtotal-energy" gas company building is 
not a user of the electricity. If the Commission considers single visitors, 
church groups, or civic groups as users of electricity then the Commission 
must attack the Mountain Fuel Supply Company as not qualifying the exemption, 
require it to shut down its total-energy plant, bring in the power company 
lines and commence buying its electricity from tho all powerful Utah Power 
and Light Company. There is no way theCommission could indulge in such a 
discrimination. 
The other vital point that the court overlooked is that the 
electrical services must be sold or purchased and neither the casual customer 
nor the church group nor civic group are paying tho Mall for electricity;, 
The tenants are the only users and they will be receiving electricity as a part 
of their rental agreement. 
THE NEW LAW 
All of this brings us to the new law of the land - a ruling by 
the United State1s Supreme Court which completely overrules the Ritter case. 
In the case of Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. vs. Donald M. Tanner et. al. 
*K>7 U.S. 55i;31 L Ed 2 131, 92 Sup Crt 2219, decidod June 22, 1972, Tanner soug 
to distribute handbills in the plaintiff1s large privately owned shopping cente 
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in Portland, Oregon. The lower court said he could on grounds of the First 
Amendment. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling (similar to 
the Ritter and 10th Circuit Court ruling) but the Supreme Court reversed the 
ruling on the grounds that the decision below violates the rights of private 
property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Lloyd Shopping Center, similar to the Cottonwood Mall in size, 
covers 50 acres including 20 acres of parking which would accommodate over 
1000 automobiles. It is crossed by several public streets and public sidewalks. 
Lloyd owns all land and buildings within the center, except these public 
streets and sidewalks. There are some 60 tenants including small shops and 
several major department stores. There axe.gardens, auditoriums and a skating 
rink. Some stores even opened directly on the outside public sidewalks. 
"The Center is open generally to the public, with a considerable 
effort being made to attract shoppers and prospective shoppers, and to 
create fcustomer motivation1 as well as customer good will in the community." 
"Groups and organizations are permitted, by invitation and advance arrange-
ments, to use the auditorium and other facilities. Rent is charged for use of 
the auditorium except with respect to certain civic and charitable organizations..." 
The District Court said the Center "is open to the general public" 
and found that it is "the functional equivalent of a public business district". 
The Supreme Court went on to reason much as we have reasoned above: 
"It is noteworthy that respondent's argument based on 
the Center being 'open to the public1 would apply in varying 
degrees to most retail stores and service establishments across the 
country. They are all open to the public in the sense that 
customers and potential customers are invited and encouraged 
to enter. In terms of being open to the public, there are 
differences only of degree - not principle - between a free standing 
store and one located in a shopping center, between a small store and 
a large one, between a single store with some malls and open areas 
designed to attract customers and Lloyd Center with its elaborate 
malls and interior landscaping." 
"Respondents contend, however, that the property of a 
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large shopping center is fopen to the public1
 f serves the same 
purposes as a business district of a municipality, and therefore 
has been dedicated to certain types of public use. The 
argument is that such a center has sidewalks, streets, and 
parking areas which are functionally similar to facilities 
customarily provided by municipalities. It is then asserted that a 
members of the public whether invited as customers or not, have 
the same right of free speech as they would have on the similar 
public facilities in the streets of a city or town." 
"The argument reaches too far. The Constitution by no 
means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of 
private property to public use. The closest decision in theory, 
Marsh vs. Alabama, supra, involved the assumption by a private 
enterprise of all of the attributes of a state-created 
municipality and the exercise by that enterprise of semi-official 
municipal functions as a delegate of the State. In effect, the 
owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of 
municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State. In the 
instant case there is no comparable assumption or exercise of 
municipal functions or power." 
"Nor does property lose its private character merely because 
the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes. 
Few would argue that a free standing store with abutting parking 
space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely 
because the public is invited to shop. Nor is size alone the 
controlling factor. The essentially private character of a store 
and its privately owned abutting property does not change by 
virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern 
shopping center." 
"We do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of private property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights 
of all citizens, must be respected and protected." 
"We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloydys 
privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to 
entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First Amend-
ment rights. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the 
case to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the 
injunction." 
Compare this well reasoned language with the shallow consideration 
of the Cottonwood Mall case by the Circuit Court as exposed by its flippant 
language that it had no Utah lamp posts to light its "Erie" way - this shows a 
lack of consideration of the merits of this case. 
In the case of Garkane Power Company vs. Public Service Commission 
Utah, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571, 132 ALR ^90 (19^0) the Court ruled against 
public regulation. The court held in that case that an association that 
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solicited membership from the public was not subject to regulations so long 
as it only sold electricity to members of the association so solicited. 
In State ex rel Public Utilities Commission of Utah vs. Nelson, 
6$ Utah 457, 238 Pac. 237 (1925), the Utah Supreme Court held that a private 
corporation could not be subjected to public regulation by mere legislative 
fiat or edict. The language used in that case is very clear and concise. That 
court stated: 
"No one may successfully contend that it is competent 
for the Legislature to regulate and control in such respect 
a mere private business or to declare a private business to be 
public service or a public utility. In other words, the state 
may not, by mere legislative fiat or edict or by regulating orders 
of a commission, convert mere private contracts or a mere private 
business into a public utility or make its owner a common carrier. 
(Citations omitted.) So, if the business or concern is not public 
service, where the public has not a legal right to the use of it, 
where the business or operation is not open to an indefinite 
public, it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the 
commission , . ." 
This language and holding was reaffirmed in Medic-Call Inc. vs. 
Public Service Commission, 2k9 Utah 2d. 273* ^70 P. 2d 258, (1970). In that 
case the Court quoted the foregoing language from the Nelson case and 
reaffirmed the principle that private corporations are not subject to public 
regulation. 
Other cases have held in similar fact situations, under similar 
statutes, the operation of large complexes, such as petitionees, are not 
subject to public regulation. See City of Sun Prairie v. The Public Service 
Commission of Wisconsin, 37 Wis. 2d 96, 15^ N.W. 2d 360 (1967), Cawker v. 
Meyer Ik? Wis. 320, 123 N.W. 127 (1911). Drexelbrook Associates v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, 418 Pa. ^ 30, 212 A. 2d 237, (1965), Story v. 
Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057, 18 A.L.R, 750 (1921), Jonas V. 
Swetland Co., 119 Ohio St. 12, 162 N.E.'(1928). 
OBVIOUSLY THE RITTER CASE HAS BEEN OVERRULED AND THE LAST FACTOR 
ON WHICH THE POWER COMPANY CAN RELY HAS BEEN ANALIZED BY THE HIGHEST COURT 
OF THE LAND AND FOUND WANTING. THE COTTONWOOD MALL PROPERTY IS NOT 
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DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE. 
We submit that theCircuit Court has decided an important 
question involving substantive state law in a manner which directly conflicts 
with the express language of a state statute wherein it failed and refused 
to recognize the fact that petitioner's operation, being clearly a private 
operation for its own use and that of its tenants, placed it within the 
statutory exception to the definition of "electrical corporation" and thus 
rendered it not subject to the state regulatory requirement of obtaining a 
certificate of convenience and necessity, 
POINT III 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH ERRORED IN HOLDING A 
PRIVATE CORPORATION, WAS SUBJECT TO PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
AND REGULATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS ? AND 22 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Courts have clearly ruled that it would be a violation of 
the U.S. Constitution of the Fourteenth Amendments and Article 1 Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution to deny the Mall the right to operate its own power 
plant in that it would be deprivation of property without due process of law. 
In the case of Producers Transportation Company vs. Railroad 
Commission of California, 251 U.S. 228 (1919), this court statedt 
"It is, of course, true that if the pipe line was 
constructed solely to carry oil for particular producers under 
strictly private contracts and never was devoted by its owner 
to public use, that is, to carrying for the public, the state coulc 
not, by mere legislative fiat or by any regulating order of a comm-
ission, convert it into a public utility or make its owner a commor 
carrier; for that would be taking private property for public 
use without just compensation, which no state can do consistently 
the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . " 
The general text statements agree with the foregoing cases. In 
43 Am. Jr., 574?f Public Utilities and Services, Section 2, it is stated: 
"As its name indicates, the term fpublic utility' implies 
a public use and service to the public; and indeed, the principal d 
minative characteristic of a public utility is that of service to, 
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or readiness to serve, an indefinite public (or portion of 
the public as such) which has a legal right to demand and 
receive its services or commodities. The term precludes 
the idea of service which is private in its nature and is not 
to be obtained by the public,M 
A state does not have the power to call a private business a 
public utility. The rule is stated in 43 Am. Jr., 57^t Public Utilities and 
Services, Section 5* as follows: 
"The legislature cannot, by its mere declaration, make 
something a public utility which is not in fact such; and a 
private business, operated under private contracts with selected 
customers and not devoted to a public use cannot, by legislative 
fiat or by order of a public service commission, be declared a 
public utility, since that would be taking private property for 
public use without just compensation, which no state can do 
consistently with the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.11 
This statement of the rule is upheld in the following cases ftom 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Michigan Public Utilities Commission 
vs. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); Prost vs. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 
(1926). In this latter case the court stated: 
"That consistently with the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a private carrier cannot be converted 
against his will into a common carrier by mere legislative 
command, is a rule not open to doubt and is not brought into 
question here". 
The Supreme Court not only cited the Duke case but also the case 
of State vs. Nelson, heretofore cited Utah Case. 
In the case of City of Sun Prairie vs. The Public Service Commission 
of Wisconsin, the court stated the tenants of a landlord are not the public; 
neither are a few of his neighbors or a few isolated individuals with whom he 
may choose to deal, though they are a part of the public. The word •public1 
must be construed to mean more than a limited class defined by the relation of 
landlord and tenant or by nearness of location, as neighbors, or more than a few 
who by reason of any peculiar relation to the owner of the plant can be served 
by him. 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court held: 
"A landlord of a large apartment complex furnishing 
heat, water, light, and power to all tenants, hut not 
serving any adjoining landowners or the public generally, 
is not a public utility and therefore not subject to 
commission jurisdiction. City of Sun Prairie vs. Wisconsin 
Pub. Service CommissiontM 
In so saying, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently handed 
down the most clear-cut decision yet as to what constitutes and ~ more 
importantly - what does not constitute a public utility. The case under 
judgement involved the owner of a large apartment development housing upwards 
of a thousand persons. The owner had installed a gas total energy plant, was 
supplying electricity and a full range of comfort services to his tenants, 
with cost of these services being included in the rents he collected, The 
local utility had sought to have the Wisconsin Public Service Commission 
classify the operation as a public utility subject to commission regulation 
as such. This theCommission refused to do, with the Circuit Court, and now th 
State Supreme Court upholding that decision. 
The decision clearly is another in a growing number of landmark 
determinations for the total energy concept, where a definite landlord -
tenant relationship which sets the 'customer1 apart from the popular definitic 
of fthe public1 can be shown. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court thus joins those of Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Missouri and California and probably many others in stating that a 
landlord may provide electricity and comfort services to his tenants without 
being classed a fpublic utility1 as defined by the statutes of those states. 
In all such decisions handed down to date, the determining factor appears 
to have been whether a particular - or •special' - relationship existed 
between owner and tenant, as opposed to a similar provision of such services 
•to whoever may require them.1 
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Under this definition, it is difficult to imagine a situation 
under which a total energy plant in an apartment complex, an office building, 
a shopping center or motel could ever be classed as a public utility. 
We again call the Courts attention to the growing hundreds of 
total energy plants throughout the nation as shown in the record. 
I cannot help but take this opportunity to be severely critical, on 
behalf of my client, the Cottonwood Mall, Mr. Horman, and myself personally 
each as Utah Power and Light Company rate payers for such a utility to cry 
poverty and demanding repeated increases in rates but at the same time main-
taining round-the-clock lobbyist to hound the unsuspecting legislators to 
pound through their "special interest" legislation such the amendments to 5^-2-1 (20) 
and to 5^-2-1 (30) enacted in 19&5 with the obvious and specific Intent to stop 
the Cottonwood Mall total-energy program. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Courts are not bound by a Federal decision but rather the 
State Courts are charged with the duty to declare the law and the Federal 
Courts are required to follow theState law. The law and logic clearly shows 
that Electrical generating plants like the plaintiff1s are exceptions and are 
not for public use and not subject to commission regulation and to hold otherwise 
would be unconstitutional. 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Keith E. Sohm 
Suite 81 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
